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Abstract
This paper conducts a theoretical comparison of the potentialeffectiveness,
in terms of money stock controllability, of interest rate andreserve instruments.
Whereas previous studies have been basically static, thepresent analysis is
carried Out in the context of a dynamic macroeconomic model withrational
expectations. Particular attention is paid to the distinction betweencontem-
poraneous and lagged reserve accounting (CRA and LRA). The criterion employed
is the expectation of squared deviations of the (log of the)money stock from
target values that are reset each period. Analysis in the basic modelsuggests
the following substantive conclusions. (1) With a reserveinstrument, monetary
control will be more effective under CRA than LRA. (2) Witha reserve instrument
and LRA, control will be poorer than with an interestrate instrument. (3) For
a wide range of parameter values, control will be better with areserve
instrument and CRA than with an interest rate instrument.
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Dallas, TX 75222I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to conduct a theoretical comparison of the
potential effectiveness, in terms of money stock controllability, of interest
rate and reserve instruments. Several studies with a similar objective have
previously been conducted, some of the more notable including Pierce and Thomson
(1972), Friedman (1975) (1977), Le Roy (1979), and Axilrod and Lindsey (1981))
These previous studies have all, however, been conducted in models that are
essentially static and therefore neglect the distinction between real and nominal
rates of interest. Our analysis, by contrast, is dynamic and presumes rational
expectations throughout. In the present paper we employ as a policy criterion
the unconditional expectation of the squared deviation of the (log of the)money
stock from "target" values that are reset period by period in light ofcomplete
aggregate data from previous periods. Given this criterion, some of our con-
clusions are similar to those obtained in static models. Our approach permits
the derivation of some new results, however, and provides a firmer understanding
of the static-model conclusions. In addition, our discussion indicates how the
analysis can be extended to cases in which the static-model results may not
provide useful approximations.
Given the extent of professional and popular discussion of the basic
"instrument choice" problem, it might seem surprising that no suchanalysis has
previously been conducted. There is, hcever, a straightforward explanation for
the absence of previous studies until very recently it appeared that thevalues
of all nominal magnitudes (including the money stock) are indeterminate ina
rational expectations context if the monetary authority uses an interestrate as
its operating instrument.2 it has been shn in NcCallum (1980a),hever, that
this indeterminancy does not prevail if an interest rate instrument isused but
is set period by period in a manner that is designed to havesome desired effect
on the expected quantity of money in the upcoming period --thatis, if at leastS
some weight is given to a money stock target.3 Thus, it is in fact possible
to conduct an analytical comparison of the type desired, even in a model entirely
free of private sector money illusion and expectational irrationality.
In the context of the interest rate vs. reserve instrument comparison, there
is a related choice to be made by the monetary authority that is of considerable
significance. In particular, given that banks are required to hold reserves
against their monetary liabilities, it is crucial to distinguish between a system
featuring contemporaneous reserve accounting, which makes current monetary liabil-
ities relevant for the determination of current required reserves, and one with
lagged reserve accounting, which makes liabilities from a previous period relevant
for current reserve requirements. This distinction is crucial because, with a
reserve instrument, potential monetary control is likely to bepoorer4 under
lagged reserve accounting ("LRA") than under contemporaneous reserve accounting
("CRA"). In fact, the combination of a reserve instrument with LRA tends to
produce the poorest results, in terms of potential monetary control, of any of
the four combinations defined by the two instruments and two accounting schemes.
It is nevertheless the case that a reserve instrument with CRA will provide the
best monetary control in our model for a large subset of plausible parameter
values.
The relevance of these results for recent monetary experience in the
United States is readily apparent. Since the Federal Reserve switched from CRA
to LEA in 1968, any subsequent attempts to use a reserve instrument will have
yielded poorer monetary control than would have been possible under CRA (or with
an interest rate instrument). It would therefore be highly inappropriate to draw
direct conclusions about the potential effectiveness of a reserve instrument on
the basis of U.S. experience since the October 6, 1979, initiation of a period
with increased emphasis on reserves.5
-2-The analytical framework within which we shall demonstrate these results
is a log-linear macroeconomic model similar to the IS-LM-phillips Curve setups
used by Sargent and Wallace (1975), Sargent (1979), and McCalluni (l980a), with
the addition of a relationship describing portfolio behavior of the banking
system. Results are also obtained for a modification in which the Sargent-
Wallace supply function, which permits prices to adjust freely within each
period, is replaced with one that has prices set in advance. In both versions
the model is highly simplified, of course, and is open to various criticisms.6
The most basic of these is that the behavioral relations are not obtained from
an analysis of optimizing behavior by individual agents, but are simply posited
as plausible and orthodox relationships. As a result, the assumption that para-
meter values in the behavioral relations will be the same under various policy
regimes is not well justified. Thus, even with the incorporation of rational
expectations, our analysis goes only part of the way tard the goal of a policy-
invariant model.
It should be said at the outset that our emphasis on the controllability of
money does not imply disagreement with the argument --madeby Kareken, Muench
and Wallace (1973), Friedman (1975) (1977), and others --thatit is in principle
inefficient for the monetary authority to rely on the "intermediate target"
procedure. Perhaps it would be better simply to focus upon ultimatetarget or
"goal" variables such as unemployment and/or inflation rates, rather than upon a
money stock target, if reliable models describing the effects of potential instru-
ments upon such goal variables were available. In fact, hcever, it appears that
such models are not available. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve System of the
United States is significantly concerned with intermediate money-stocktargets,
and is charged to be so concerned by the U.S. Congress. Consequently, muchprofessional and practical analysis presumes the use of monetary targets. Given
this situation, our object is to advance professional understanding of the al-
ternative control techniques potentially available.
The outline of the paper is as folls. In Section II we describe the
modelandin Section III obtain the main analytical results forthecases with
contemporaneous reserve accounting. In Section IV comparable results for lagged
reserve accounting are derived, and in Section V qualifications andideasfor
futurestudy are described. A brief conclusion and an appendix are also provided.
-4-II. Analytical Framework
Let us begin by briefly describing the relationships thatrepresent
aggregate demand and supply behavior in our model economy, before turning to
consideration of the banking sector. As in McCallum (l9SOa),we adopt slightly
modified versions of the IS, LM, and aggregate supply (Phillipscurve) relation-
ships used by Sargent and Wallace (1975). Lety, andm denote logarithms
of aggregate output, the price level, and themoney stock (respectively) and let
be the nominal interest rate. Also, let
u, Vt and be stochastic distur-
bances. Then we have:
(1) y =b+ b1[r -(Eip+1
— +v b1 < 0
(2) m Pt =c+ c1r +c2y + c1 < 0 < c2
(3) =a+
a1(p
—Eip)+ a2y1 +u a1 > 0
1 > a2 > 0.
In (1), demand for consumption plus investment isnegatively related to the real
rate of interest. Here and elsewhere theoperator Ei denotes the expectation
of the indicated variable within the model andconditional upon values of all
variables realized in periods prior to t. Theprecise specification of the real
interest rate variable follows Sargent (1979) and isdiscussed in McCallum (1980a,
pp.4-5)
8
Equation (2) is a demand function formoney, the asset used by the economy's
agents as a medium of exchange. The demand for real balances istaken to be
positively dependent upon the transaction "scale" variabley and negatively
dependent upon the nominal rate of interest.
—5—Finally, equation (3) is an aggregate supply function of the natural
rate variety, rationalized by Lucas (1973) and utilized by numerous authors.
Since some critics find the extent of price level flexibility provided by (3)
to be excessive, we shall also consider in Section III an alternative specifica-
tion that makes prices "sticky" within each period --andwhich leads to a simpli-
fication of the instrument comparison expressions.
The stochastic disturbances in equations (l)-(3), u, v, and fl'are
assumed to be generated by mutually independent white noise processes. Each
disturbance, moreover, is taken to be independent of (as well as uncorrelated
with) past values of all disturbances and variables.
We now turn to the banking sector. The standard specification in the
literature cited in the introduction relates the money stock positively to the
nominal market rate of interest and to some reserve aggregate.9 Let ht denote
the log of the relevant reserve aggregate --e.g.,total reserves, non-borrowed
reserves, or the monetary base. Then a stochastic version of the standard
relationship might be written as
(4) m =V0+ v1r +v2h
+ v1,
"2 > 0
where is a temporally inependent, white noise disturbance that is also in-
dependent of v, and Relations of this type have been referred to as
"money supply" functions by some writers and as "reserve demand" functions by
others. The first of these terms is not generally appropriate, however, since
such functions play no part in determining the value of m when an interest rate
instrument is being employed, Consequently, we shall use the reserve-demand
terminology in what follows)0
-6-There are also several substantive points concerning equation (4) that
require discussion. First, since m and h pertain to values for the same time
period, the equation can be applicable only if CRA is in effect. If, on the
other hand, LRA is operative, required reserves will be related to some past
value of rn. To keep matters as simple as possible, let us suppose that our
"periods" are of the same duration as the lag in reserve accounting. Then under
LRA we might have11
(4') m1 =+v1r + v2h +
where, in order to maintain comparability with (4),wesuppose that the parameters
on the right-hand side --includingthe variance of --areprecisely the same as
under CPA. As that assumption is important in what follcqs, it is here that the
aforementioned absence of individual optimization analysis is most serious.
Another issue that needs to be addressed is whether there is, in fact, a
reserve aggregate that can be manipulated as an instrument. Our view, basically,
is that a variable can appropriately be treated as an instrument --presuming
that it can be affected by the Fed --ifit can be observed "instantaneously".
The idea, of course, is that if a variable can be observed instantaneously it
can be "continuously" monitored and therefore kept on its chosen path by appli-
cation of the requisite open-market stimulus. One conclusion, then, is that any
variable that can be measured from the Fed's own balance sheet is in principle a
feasible instrument: given today's computational and communicational facilities
it is technically possible for the Fed to compile daily balance sheets. And in
the context of a model with a twoweek (or one-week) time period, daily obser-
vations on a variable make it effectively observable "instantaneously". Obviously
this argument does not identify which specific variables are actually available
-7-as instruments in the U.S. economy--thatwill depend on current regulations
and institutions)2 But it seems to provide adequate refutation of the occa-
sionally-voiced notion that no reserve aggregate can be used as aninstrument.'3
Ofcourse we recognize that under current arrangements precise control
of reserve aggregates cannot be accomplished even with contemporaneous observa-
bility. One reason is that open-market operations cease before the discount
wind closes on the last day of each statement period --oneach Wednesday
afternoon. Also it i-s uncle;r that adequate balance sheet data. is compiled daily.
Such practices are not, hcwever, immutable. In a study of the potential for
monetary control under alternative regimes, it seems inappropriate to presume
that the Fed would fail to take feasible steps that would make potential in-
struments controllable. Our aim is not to predict what policy makers will do,
but to understand the effects of what they could do under alternative, feasible
14
arrangements.
Given the point of view just expressed, we shall not specify which of the
frequently-discussed reserve measures --totalreserves, non-borred reserves,
or the monetary base --isreferred to by our reserve variable, ht.'5 As there
is comparatively little dispute about which actual interest rate should be em-
phasized, we shall occasionally refer to r as the "federal funds rate". Formally,
however,itis simply "the" nominal interest rate in our aggregative model.
Finally, to complete the model, we need a relation describing policy behavior,
one which determines either h or r on a period-by-period basis. In each case
we assume that the instrument, h or r, is set according to a deterministic
feedback rule that specifies h orr as a linear function of variables realized
in period t—1 or before. And in each case, we assume that this linear function
is chosen so as to make the expected value ofm, that is, Et_,cn, equal to a
target value denoted We conceive of m itself being set by a deterministic,
—8-linear feedback rule --perhaps,but not necessarily, one that attempts to
"lean against the wind" in sczne fashion. Butsinceour concern will be h
well the target values (for t=l,2,...) are attained, we will not need to
specify any pazticular rule for determining ui.Allwe need note is that,
sinceit is determined by a feedback rule, there are no one-period expectational
** errors:Eim
=m.
-9-III. Monetary Control Under CRA
Inthis section we derive expressions for our monetary control criterion,
the mean—squared error E(m —m)2,
under a regime of contemporaneous reserve
accounting. First we find the value of E(m —m)2implied by the model when h
is set at the beginning of period t to make Eim =m,with r then determined
in the marketplace. We find, that is, the minimum mean square control error when
the reserve aggregate is used as the operating Instrument. In this case, the




These equations determine values of y,m, and h.
Since our interest is in the expected square of m —m,let us begin by
using (4) and (5) to obtain
(6) m_ m =vi(r
—E1r)÷•
Nextwe develop "innovation't versions of (l)—(3) by applying the operator to





(8) m — = — + c1(r




-10-Elimination of the innovations fory, andr then leaves us with the desired
expression for m —m.
It is:







Since we have assumed that the disturbances are mutually independent, the
mean squared control error is then





where a is the variance ofr, etc.
Next we take the case in which the federal funds rate,r, is the operating





and m —mis expressible as
(13) mt — Pt
—
Etipt + c2(y —Etiy)+
Equations (9) and (7) ——withrt —E_ir
=0——canthen be used to eliminate the
innovations for p andy. The resulting expression is
—11—(14)
where is as before. The control criterion is., obviously,
(15) E(m —*)2=+ a2+
(C2•)2
Given our specification, it is not clear whether expression (11) or (15) is
the smaller. The variance of the banking sector disturbance, a, does not appear
on the right—hand side of (15), which tends to make the criterion smaller with
the funds rate instrument. But the divisor, (1 —*1)2in (11), is unambiguously
greater than 1.0, which tends to make the reserve instrument preferable. Which
tendency predominates depends upon the magnitudes of and the various variances.
One useful way of simplifying the expression for E(m -m)2is to note
that, as the parameter a1 grows in magnitude, $japproachesc2. This eliminates
the term involving o from (11) and (15), and generates the implication that the
reserve instrument ht will be superior to the funds rate instrument r if
222 22
(16)





•c2b1+c where *1 = 1<0.Rearranging, we obtain the condition
1
2 222
(17) *1 a + C2(J
2 2
Here the left-hand expreèslon is positive and less than 1.0. Thus, even ithOut
knowledge of the magnitude of 4,wecan conclude that the reserve instrument will
be superior provided that
—12-222 a+ca
(18) 1< 2v
But this condition will obtain, whatever the magnitude ofc2, unlessc:r2 is at
least as large as a2. Furthermore, relatively small absolute values of ——
reflectingrelatively large values of v1 ——willdecrease the left—hand side of
(18) and make the sufficient condition less stringent.. Consequently, it seems
rather likely that the reserve instrument will be superior ——givencontempor—
16 aneous reserve accounting! ——ifa1 is large.
But why should that condition, a relatively large value fora1, be consid-
ered likely? The answer, of course, is that a largea1 value implies a high sensi-
tivity of supply to the price level expectation error. Conversely, then, a large
a1 value corresponds to a situation in which actual inflation responds weakly,
given inflationary expectations, to the value ofy relative to normal ——i.e.,to
a relatively flat one—period Phillips relationship. That such a specification is
empirically relevant is, of course, widely believed to be the case.
A bit of additional discussion may be warranted. Suppose we write (3)
in the form just alluded to, as follows:
—t—l
= — a2y1
—a]+ Ei(pt — —
Inthe limit, as a1 -, thisrelationship degenerates to the conditionPt =Eip.
Givenrational epectations this implies thatp is determined entirely by condi—
tions prevailing in t—l and is unaffected by shocks occurring in t.Beyondthat,
however, it does not specify aggregate supply or price behavior so some additional
relationship must be included as a replacement for (3). One attractive specifica—
tion, previously used by Barro and Grossman (1976), Mussa (1980), and McCallum
(1980b), is as follows:
-13Pt — = a1(_1 +E1( — ;a1
>0
Hereisthe capacity or "full employment" value of while is the value of
Pt that would make aggregate demand equal to given actual policy actions in t.
Thus (19) is an accelerationist Phillips curve with the inflation rate determined
by the previous period's level of excess demand and the expected rate of inflation
of the full-employment price level, rather than the actual price level. Consider-
able discussion of such a relationship is provided by NcCallum (l980b) and Mussa
(1980). For present purposes, the main relevant feature of (19) is simply that
it makes Pt predetermined and thus equal toEt_ipt. so that the -Eipterms
vanish from equations (7) and (8). Other supply functions with thatproperty
would also lead to the conclusion based on (18).
-14-IV. Monetary Control Under LRA
We now turn to the derivation of expressions for the criterionE(m —
inregimes with lagged reserve accounting. In the case in which the instrument is
the funds rater, there are no new calculations to make: since banking behavior
does not affect m whenr is the instrument, the relevant criterion expression
is again given by (15). In the case of the reserve instrument, however, a new
calculation is needed. Indeed, the nature of monetary control with a reserve
instrument is drastically different under LRA than it is under CRA. This can be
seen from the banking sector behavioral equation (4'), in which the effect of
ht
occurs only indirectly, by way of when LRA is in force7 The optimal
setting for h is obtained from (4') only after r in (4') is replaced by the
value of Eir that equates E1m to m in the money demand function (2), as
follows:
(20) ht =[mt_i
— — V1cj1(m*Et_iPt —c—
c2Eiy)i /v2
Thus with LRA, monetary control with a reserve instrument amounts to an indirect
method of exercising control with an interest rate! One would expect such apro-
cedure to provide relatively poor monetary control, and such is the case —_aswe
shall now demonstrate.
To determine the value of E(m —ni)2with LRA and the h instrument, we use
equations (7), (8), and (9) and the innovation version of (4'), which is
(21) 0 =v(r
—E1r)+
Elimination of innovations iny, p, andrfrom these four equations then yields
—1.5-(22) m
=+1v + (c2 —1)u
—
where and are as defined above. From (22), then, we immediately obtain
(23) E(m -m*)2=+ + Cc2 - +
And from the latter we are able to draw some quite definite conclusions. First,
since <0,(1 — isgreater than 1.0, so a comparison of (23) with (11)
shows that the mean squared control error with the h instrument is unambiguously
larger under LRA than under CRA.
The quantitative magnitude of this effect may not, moreover, be small. To
see this, suppose that c1 =—v1;
I.e., that the interest rate semi—elasticities
of money demand and supply are equal in magnitude. Then with >0and b1 <0,
the value of =(1b1+ c1) /V1 isnegative and greater than 1.0 in absolute
value. Consequently, 1 — exceeds2.0 and (1 —I1)2
is greater than 4.0. The
magnitude of the mean squared control error in (23) is therefore over four times
as great as in (11).
Furthermore, since (_l)2 >0,the mean squared error in (23) is also
greater than that in (15), which holds for the r instrument with either CRA or
LRA. Thus, the h —LRAcombination provides the poorest monetary control among
18
the four possibilities considered.
Finally, since some analysts have suggested that excess reserves are
highly insensitive to interest rate movements, let us briefly consider results
that obtain as v1— 0. This implies, since ( $1b1+ c1)/v1, that
Of course, the behavior of the control error is independent of reserve demand
parameters when r is used as the instrument, a conclusion that is verified by
-16-*2
expression (15). With h used as the instrument, however, E(m -m)approaches
andunder CRA AND LRA systems, respectively: see expressions (11) and (23).
Thus the results in this limiting case do not alter the main conclusions.
-17-V. Generalizations and Qualifications
It is important to recognize that the foregoing results are robust to
model specification in some significant respects. Onesuchrespect involves
distributed—lag modifications of the behavioral equations. Suppose, for example,
that the money demand equation (2) was replaced with a distributed—lag version
such as the following:
J J




Here itis assumed that past, as well as present, values of r andy
influence
moneydemand inperiod t, with the number of relevant past values, J, arbitrarily
large.It is important that generalizations of this type be considered, because
with a two—week definition of the time period, large values of J will presumably
be required for a realistic specification. But this extension has no effect on
the foregoing analysis, for it is the innovation version of the relationship that







whichIsidentical in form to (8). Allthatis neededinmaking this generaliza-
tion is to interpret the a, b, c, and v parameters as those applicable to the
first—period response in a distributed—lag formulation. Thus, for example, c1 in
(8) must be interpreted as c10 in (24). Clearly, the same type of argument would
apply if, instead of (24), we had a money—demand specification of the partial
adjustment type often used in empirical work, as follows:
-18-(26) Pt =c+ c1r + c2y + c3(m1 — +
Furthermore, the stochastic disturbances in the behavioral equations do not need
to be white noises. If in (2) were, for Instance, of the form
(27) t =p_i÷
with white, then a familiar transformation would convert the equation to one
with lagged values of y, and — onthe right—hand side in which the
disturbance is the white noise .Consequently,expressions such as (11), (15),
and (23) continue to prevail if the disturbance variances are interpreted as those
applicable to the unpredictable component of behavior in period t, such as
instead of
There are, however, other modest changes in the model's specification which
will not leave our results unaffected. One that is of considerable importance
Involves the dating of the expectation operator In the IS equation. According to
specification (1), agents do not have knowledge of period—t magnitudes when
forming expectations of inflation between periods t and t+l, expectations used in
converting nominal into real interest rates. An alternative specification that





Here Etp+i is the expectation of within the model conditional upon values
of y, m, p, r, and h in period t, as well as periods prior to t. Given this
change, the innovation version of the IS function, equation (7), no longer obtains.
In its place we have instead
-19—(28) y -Etlyt =b(r
-Eir)
-bi(Ept÷i
-EiP+i) + bi(P -Et_iP)+ Vt,
in which the change in the expectation (between t-l and t) of appears. With
this change, the model becomes dynamic in a more thoroughgoing sense. As a result,
it ceases to be one in which E(m m*)2 is computable without reference to the
behavioral rules specifying m.
There is one special case of some interest in which the results presented
in previous sections continue to hold precisely even if (27) is used instead of
(1). That case is the one in which no lagged terms appear in the IS,LN, or
aggregate supply equations --i.e.,in which equations (27), (2), and (3) prevail
with a2 =0--andthe policy rule specifying m makes these target values
exogenous and known in advance (as, for example, a constant money-growth rule).
Under these conditions, the usual undetermined-coefficient solution equations for
the endogenous variables will include only m and current disturbances on the right-
hand side. In particular, p will obey
(29) Pt ='o+ ir11m + rri2u + r13v + l4t +
where the 1r1.'s are constant coefficients related to the parameters of (27), (2),
(3) and the policy rule. Consequently, we have
(30) Etpt÷l Etlpt÷l = +¶TllEm÷l -(rT+ TriiE im÷i) =0
and the change in the expectation of disappears from (28), leaving (7) to be
used as before in the computation of m -m.
In general, however, the results will differ from those based on the IS
specification (1) and will depend upon the policy rule that governs m. For any
-20-given rule the model is solvable in principle, but the calculations maybe
much more complex than those presented above. Furthermore, the results for
E(mm*)2 will dependupon the precise distributed-lag specifications in
the IS, LM, aggregate supply, and reserve demand equations. This sensitivity
makes it unlikely that any conclusions of wide applicability would be forth-
coming from an analysis that uses specification (27).
2 1-VI. Conclusions
The twomain substantiveresults of the paper are easily sunnarized, as
folls. First, from the standpoint of monetary control, a reserve instrument
will19 perform less well with lagged reserve accounting than with contemporaneous
reserve accounting. Second, it seems likely that a reserve instrument will, with
comtemporaneous reserve accounting, permit tighter monetary control than will
an interest rate instrument (which is equally effective under lagged and con-
temporaneous accounting).
In terms of analytical interest, one conclusion is that the messages
concerning monetary control are not drastically different in a dynamic, rational
expectations modelthanin a static modelprovidedthat current information is
unavailable to agents in forming expectations about the inflation rate relevant
to the real-nominal interest rate distinction. If this current information is
available, hxever, the substantive results described above will hold only for
highly special cases of the model and it seems unlikely that other general results
are obtainable.
-22—APPENDIX
The purpose here to derive the expression for the mean-squaredmoney
control error, E(m m)2, for the case in which a reserve instrument is used
under LRA and the reserve demand equation is of the form mentioned in footnote
ii, namely,
(A-i) ôm + (1 -6)m1
=+v1r + v2h +
with 0 ￿ 6 ￿1.Here it is presumed that the right-hand side parameters (in-
cluding o) have the same values as in equations (4) and (4').
Before beginning the analysis, let us briefly motivate specification (A-i).
Suppose that the reserve instrimient used Is the monetary base, HR + C
t t
20/
where Rt and C denote total reserves and currency in circulation,respectively.
Also let the money stock beMt =C+ Dt where Dt =demanddeposits. (These
are raw values, not logarithms.) Then assume that money holders keep a constant
fraction, k, of their money balances in the form of currency; thus= and
=(1_k);Next assume that banks desired reserves can be expressed as
(A—2) =p(Di,r)
with p1 > 0 and p2 < 0. That desired reserves in period t mustdepend positively
upon Dt_i is -clear, given LRA. The lower isr. in addition, the more excess
reserves will be held for possible use in period t + 1.
From (A-2) and the identities we have
(A-3) Ht =C+ p(D..1, r)
tPt(l_k)Mi, rJ
-23-which relates H positively to both Mt and Mi and negatively to r. Equation
(A-i) is simply a rearranged version of the best approximation to (A-3) that is
linear in ht =logHt,
=logNt, me_i =logMt_li and r.
- Todetermine the value of E(tn -mp2
in the case athandwe use
equations (7), (8), and (9) plus the innovation version of (A-i), which is
(A-4)
-m)v1(r -E1r)+
Elimination of the innovations in andr from these four equations then
yields
*'!l+ 1v + (c2 -i)u-!ijC
(A-5) W-m=
1-
where$ andI7are defined above. From (A-5), then we immediately obtain
222 22 22 2 a,.+a +(c -) +* * lv 2 1u
(A-6) E(m - m) = 2
which is the desired expression.
To what extent do the conclusions of Section IV survive the change from
(4') to (A-l)? First, since l < 0, the value of (1 - in (11) is greater
than t-he value of (1 - o*l)2 in (A-6). Thus the mean squared control error with
the ht instrument continues to be unambiguously larger under LRA than under CRA.
And with small values of 8 the quantitative magnitude of the difference may
again be large.
Second, since (f)2 > 0, the numerator on the right-hand side of (A-6)
is greater than the expression in (15). Thus, for small values of 6, the mean
squared error in (A-6) will exceed that in (15). For a substantial range of
-24-parameter values, then, theh-LRA combinationcontinues to provide the poorest
monetary control, even with the modified reserve demand equation.
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-27-FOOTNYES
1.These studies employ an analytical approach developed in the well-known
and justly influential paper by Poole (1970).
2. The source of this belief is the famous paper by Sargent and Wallace (1975).
The result developed in that paper (and discussed further by Sargent (1979))
obtains when the interest rate policy rule is not designed to have a desired
effect on the money stock or the price level.
3. In this case, the system includes one economic actor --themonetary author-
ity --whois concerned with nominal magnitudes. Price level indeterminacy
occurs, as Patinkin (1965, pp. 303-309) clearly describes, when there is no one
whose real supply or demand behavior depends upon nominal magnitudes.
4. "Poorer" in terms of oi. criterion, described above, and in our model.
5. Here we are accepting at face value the Fed's claim to have altered procedures
to more nearly reflect a reserve instrument procedure. It would probably not be
accurate, however, to describe this recent period as one in which a reserve instru-
ment is used in any very pure sense.
6. Severe criticism of IS-LM relationships, even when used with classical supply
functions, has been expressed by Kareken and Wallace (1980).
7. Of course the sameistrue of the studies of Pierce and Thomson (1972),
Friedman (1975) (1977), Le Roy (1979), and virtually all writers on the subject
of monetary control. A partial exception is provided by Goodfriend (1981), who
develops a dynamic optimizing analysis of banks' behavior with respect to borrowed
reserves.
8. The possibility that agents have knowledge of period t magnitudes when forming
expectations regarding is considered below, in Section V.
-28-9. See, fo; example, Pierce and Thomson (1972, P. 118), Friedman (1975, P. 445)
(1977,p. 305), LeRoy (1979, p. 461), Sivesind andHurley(1980, p. 200), and --
implicitly--Axilrodand Lindsey (1981, p. 247).
10. We recognize, nevertheless, that in somecasesequations analogous to (4)
may reflect not only the portfolio behavior of banks but also the desires of the
non-bank public regarding the composition of its money holdings.
11. More generally, reserve demand might be dependent upon both current and
lagged values of the money stock, in which case the relationship comparable to
(4) would be ôm + (l_â)mi =+vir + v2h + with 0 ￿a ￿ 1.This sort
of relationship would be implied if h were interpreted as the monetary base and
the non-bank public maintained a constant ratio of currency to demand deposits.
For more discussion, and an analysis of this case, see the Appendix.
12. The practice of counting lagged vault cash txard current reserves, for example,
tends to make total reserves more nearly controllable than the base.
13. Previous arguments along lines similar to ours have been made by Burger (1972)
and Meltzer (1969).
14. We do, hever, presume that fractional reserve banking is maintained.
15. Thus we are not compelled to support or dispute the contention that total
reserves could not possibly be used as an instrument under LRA, even if the
discount window was closed before the cessation of open-market activities on the
last day of the statement period.
16. The same result was obtained, within a static model, by Axilrod andLindsey
(1981). Also see LeRoy and Lindsey (1978).
-29-17. This and subsequent statements in this paragraph are based on the reserve
demand specification (4') and are not strictly applicable to the more general
version used in the Appendix.
18. This conclusion does not obtain for all parameter values when (4') is
modified as in the Appendix. It still holds, however, for small values of the
parameter 8.
19. In the model considered.
20. Note that the setup does not reflect provisions whereby lagged vault cash
is counted toward current reserves.
-30-